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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-08-cv-02265) 
District Judge:  Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 8, 2011 
 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 25, 2011) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 The plaintiff-appellants in this case are 32 prisoners,1
                                                 
1  The initial complaint included 39 plaintiffs, but only 38 signed the notice of appeal.  
Allan Shuster, Stephen Mann, Desi R. Sykes, John Martini and Christopher Tirado 
failed to sign or file a letter joining in appellants’ brief.  As such, these parties are 
dismissed pursuant to 3rd Cir. LAR Misc. 107.2(b).  By separate order Raymond Cook 
was dismissed as a party.  Of the initial 39 plaintiffs, 32 remain as appellants in this 
action. 
 housed in several different 
facilities across New Jersey and Massachusetts.  They filed suit against 19 defendants, 
who are state government and corrections officials in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and 
Maryland.  The 25 prisoners housed at the New Jersey State Penitentiary (“NJSP”) also 
filed a motion for a temporary restraining order against the NJSP, seeking release from 
the prison’s isolation wing.  The District Court dismissed all plaintiffs except for 
Boretsky from the action, and dismissed Boretsky’s complaint without prejudice, with 
 
 
3 
leave to amend.2
I 
  The District Court also denied without prejudice the motion for a 
restraining order.  Following an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration, the plaintiffs 
appealed. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the case, and 
because the District Court provided a thorough exposition of the claims involved, we will 
provide only those background facts necessary to our decision.  In short, the underlying 
complaint in this case included a wide variety of claims.  The NJSP plaintiffs complained 
that they were unlawfully placed in an isolation wing.  They also alleged:  an unlawful 
conspiracy between New Jersey officials to deprive them of their constitutional rights; 
that they endured cruel and unusual punishment, denial of access to the courts, and 
deprivations of due process; that NJSP violates health and safety standards; and that they 
are generally denied sufficient recreational, educational, and job opportunities, as well as 
access to the law library.  Several NJSP inmates raised claims that they were unlawfully 
deprived of opportunities to practice their religion or to attend religious services.  There 
were also some complaints regarding the NJSP inmates’ ability to access rehabilitative 
services, such as twelve-step programs.  Several of the inmates argued that their 
placement in segregation violated interstate compacts, under which they were serving out 
sentences imposed by other states. 
                                                 
2  The Clerk of the District Court was then directed to open new, separate cases for all 
but two of the dismissed co-plaintiffs; these plaintiffs were given leave to file 
amended complaints. 
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 Plaintiff Hannon, who was housed at NJSP after having been housed in 
institutions in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, alleged that he was unlawfully 
transferred in retaliation for filing lawsuits and petitions for post-conviction relief, both 
for himself and other inmates.  He also claimed that defendant Reisinger attempted to 
interfere with his ability to pursue claims by dismissing one of his grievances, thereby 
preventing him from properly exhausting his claims, as required by the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act.  He further alleged that defendants Beard, Hendricks, and Reisinger 
communicated “disruptive thoughts” to other defendants, which resulted in retaliatory 
conduct against him.  Finally, he claimed that, when he was transferred to NJSP, 
corrections officials lost or unlawfully confiscated legal materials in his possession, 
including his own documents and materials belonging to the Massachusetts plaintiffs and 
two of the New Jersey plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs alleged that, because these materials were 
then unavailable, Hannon and the other inmates lost their cases in court, or fared less 
favorably than they might otherwise have.  Those inmates Hannon was assisting raised 
related claims for relief based on the defendants’ conduct in transferring Hannon and 
causing their materials to go missing. 
 The District Court determined, sua sponte, that the plaintiffs were not properly 
joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20.  Accordingly, the District Court 
dismissed all plaintiffs – except for Boretsky, the first named plaintiff – from the action, 
and, with regard to Boretsky, dismissed the action without prejudice and with leave to file 
an amended complaint asserting his individual claims within 30 days.  The District Court 
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also directed that individual cases be opened for each of Boretsky’s co-plaintiffs, and that 
they be granted 30 days to amend.3
II 
  The plaintiffs filed a joint motion to reconsider, 
accompanied by a purported joint amended complaint.  The District Court denied the 
motion to reconsider, and the plaintiffs appealed. 
 Briefing in this case was stayed pending our decision in Hagan v. Rogers, 570 
F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2009), because that case dealt with issues relevant to this appeal.  The 
first such issue is the question whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s order denying joinder and dismissing the complaint without prejudice.  
“Generally, an order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final nor 
appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting the 
cause of action.”  Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam).  “Only if the plaintiff cannot amend or declares his intention to stand on his 
complaint does the order become final and appealable.”  Id. at 951-52.  In this case, the 
plaintiffs filed a reconsideration motion alleging that the District Court’s analysis of the 
joinder issue was incorrect, as well as a joint amended complaint – which was 
substantially similar to the original complaint – that purported to resolve any joinder 
problems.  As in Hagan, we are satisfied that the plaintiffs’ actions demonstrated that 
they elected to stand upon their original complaint; thus, the District Court’s order can be 
                                                 
3  The District Court directed that new cases not be opened for plaintiffs Cook and 
Reed, who failed to comply with the Local Civil Rule requiring that they provide a 
mailing address. 
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considered final, and we have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
See 570 F.3d at 151-52. 
 Next, we turn to the question whether the District Court erred in concluding that 
joinder was inappropriate in this case.  We review the District Court’s order severing the 
parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 for abuse of discretion.  See 
Hagan, 570 F.3d at 152.  We may affirm on any ground supported by the record.  See 
Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001).  Rule 20 permits several plaintiffs 
to join – or several defendants to be joined in – an action if (1) the claims by the 
plaintiffs, or against the defendants, arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series 
of transactions or occurrences, and (2) a question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs 
or all defendants will arise in the action.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).  “In exercising its 
discretion [to join parties], the District Court must provide a reasoned analysis that 
comports with the requirements of the Rule, and that is based on the specific fact pattern 
presented by the plaintiffs and claims before the court.”  Hagan, 570 F.3d at 157.   
 Here, the District Court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirements 
of Rule 20.  We agree.  For example, Hannon’s and his co-plaintiffs’ claims regarding 
their lost legal materials bear no relation to the NJSP plaintiffs’ claims that they were 
improperly placed in segregation and forced to endure unconstitutional conditions, and 
vice versa.  Likewise, Hannon’s claims that certain defendants conspired against him, 
resulting in retaliatory transfers and difficulties in pursuing administrative relief, did not 
bear on any other plaintiff’s claims.  In short, the plaintiffs’ various claims did not arise 
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from the same occurrence or series of occurrences, and there was no claim common to all 
plaintiffs.4
 We note that, in concluding that joinder was inappropriate, the District Court cited 
the decisions of several other district courts for the proposition that general 
“impracticalities inherent in multiple-prisoner litigation militate against the permissive 
joinder of prisoner plaintiffs otherwise allowed by Rule 20(a)(1).”  D. Ct. Op., at 13.  We 
need not consider the propriety of the District Court’s analysis in that regard – although 
we have questioned reliance on such general propositions, see Hagan, 570 F.3d at 156-57 
& n.5 – because we are satisfied that the District Court’s decision reflects a thorough 
consideration of the requirements of Rule 20, as applied to the specific facts raised in the 
plaintiffs’ complaint.   
  Although some of the plaintiffs’ claims might ordinarily be good candidates 
for joinder, we cannot say that, given the hodgepodge of claims raised in the original 
complaint, the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Boretsky’s co-plaintiffs 
from the action and directing the plaintiffs to file separate complaints. 
 Because the District Court properly dismissed Boretsky’s co-plaintiffs from the 
action, we also perceive no error in the District Court’s denial of the motion for a 
temporary restraining order.  The denial of that motion was without prejudice to the right 
of each plaintiff to file such a motion in his individual case. 
 Finally, we turn to the District Court’s decision denying the motion to reconsider, 
which we review for abuse of discretion.  See Caver v. Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 258 (3d 
                                                 
4 The District Court also correctly noted that there was no claim common to all 
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Cir. 2005).  To prevail on a motion for reconsideration, a party must demonstrate:  
“(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new 
evidence . . .; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest 
injustice.”  Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 
(3d Cir. 1999).  “A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to ‘relitigate old matters, 
raise argument[,] or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of 
judgment.’”  Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)).  Here, the 
plaintiffs contended that the District Court erred in severing Boretsky’s co-plaintiffs from 
the action.  However, they did not explain how the District Court erred in its analysis or 
identify pertinent law or facts that the District Court overlooked.  Rather, they merely 
expressed their disagreement with the District Court’s decision, and that argument was 
insufficient to warrant reconsideration.  The District Court properly denied the motion. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm.
                                                                                                                                                             
defendants. 
                                                               
